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I. PERPLEXING CHANGES IN SECURITIES LAWS  
For the past several decades, Congress and the Supreme Court have been fighting 
a great tug of war over securities fraud litigation, particularly claims made under Section 
310(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.1 On July 30, 2002, President Bush signed 
into law the Accounting Reform and Investment Protection Act, more commonly known 
as Sarbanes Oxley (SOX), and set the stage for the latest battle in the securities-litigation 
tug of war.2
Financial scandals involving WorldCom, Qwest, Tyco, and Enron eventually cost 
shareholders around $460 billion.3 After the devastating collapse of these corporate 
giants, the government needed something to restore investor confidence in publicly 
traded companies, and SOX was born.4 Introduced by Democratic Senator Paul Sarbanes 
of Maryland, the SOX Act and amendments to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
created several mandatory changes in the operations of publicly traded companies.5
This Comment focuses specifically on changes SOX made with regard to 
securities fraud litigation.6 One of these changes amended Title 28, Section 1658 of the 
United States Code to establish a longer statute of limitations, as well as, a longer statute 
of repose for securities fraud claims under Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act.7 Congress 
extended the one year statute of limitations, applicable from the time of the discovery of 
fraud, to two years and the three year statute of repose, applicable from the time of the 
violation, to five years.8 The amendment, Section 804 of SOX, also noted the effective 
date of the longer statutes of limitation and repose.9 Section 804(b) states it “shall apply 
 
1 See generally Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211 (1995) (analyzing a 
violation of the constitutional separation of powers created by the enactment of section 
27A the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991, 105 Stat. 2236 
(1991)).  
2 15 U.S.C § 7201 (2002). 
3 John Paul Lucci, Enron--TheBankruptcy Heard Around the World and the International 
Ricochet of Sarbanes - Oxley, 67 ALB. L. REV. 211, 212 (2003).  
4 See Bruce Vanyo, Stuart Kagan & John Classen, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002: A 
Securities Litigation Perspective, 1332 PLI/Corp 89, 120 (2002). 
5 See id. at 94 (“The Act fundamentally alters oversight of public company accounting. It 
institutes a host of new criminal and civil penalties against companies and management 
centered on proper accounting. The Act alters the way companies manage their 
documents”).  
6 See discussion infra Parts II, III, IV, V, VI.  
7 See In re Heritage Bond Litig., 289 F.Supp.2d 1132, 1147 (2003).  Section 10(b) 
provides: 
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or 
instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any national 
securities exchange— 
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered 
on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered,  
or any securities-based swap agreement (as defined in section 206B of the Gramm-
Leach-Bliley Act), any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention 
of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or 
appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors. 
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2000).  
8 28 U.S.C. § 1658 (2005). 
9 Id. 
4to all proceedings addressed by this section that are commenced on or after the date of 
enactment of this act.”10 Immediately, investors filed claims previously time barred 
before the introduction of SOX, and a handful of courts were forced to decide whether 
these claims could be heard.11 
The question of whether an amended statute of limitations revives previously 
time-barred claims is not a new issue in securities fraud litigation.12 The issue has 
volleyed between Congress and the judiciary in a kind of legal tennis match for the past 
few decades.13 The question of retroactivity with reference to SOX presents much 
confusion.14 Due to political pressures, the SOX legislation flew through Congress.15 
The Act has been criticized as hastily passed and poorly drafted.16 It is an open question 
whether SOX applies retroactively.17 It was written imperfectly and subject to what has 
been considerable litigation.18 “Even if a longer statute of limitations period is warranted 
. . . [i]t is inconsistent with express statutes of limitation already contained in the federal 
securities laws and is likely to create significant interpretational difficulties for courts.”19 
The first two courts to decide if the extended statute of limitations revived 
previously time-barred claims held in opposite manners.20 More claims came forward to 
press the issue, but the few courts that addressed it found themselves mired in confusion 
 
A period of limitations bars an action if the plaintiff does not file suit within a set period 
of time from the date on which the cause of action accrued. In contrast, a period of repose 
bars a suit a fixed number of years after an action by the defendant.  
Quakk v. Dexia, 357 F.Supp.2d 330, 337 (D. Mass. 2005) (quoting Beard v. J.I. 
Case Co., 823 F.2d 1095, 1097 n.1 (7th Cir. 1987)).  
10 Pub. L. No.107-204, § 804(b), 2002 U.S.C.C.A.N. (116 Stat.) (to be codified at 28 
U.S.C. § 1658).  
11 See In re Heritage, 89 F. Supp.2d  at 1132. 
12 See Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 211 (1995).  
13 See generally id. (analyzing a violation of the constitutional separation of powers 
created by the enactment of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act 
of 1991, 105 Stat. 2236 (1991)). 
14 Michael A. Perino, Statute of Limitations Under the Newly Passed Sarbanes-Oxley Act,
N.Y.L.J at 4, Aug. 2, 2002.  
15 See Vanyo, supra note 4, at 120.  
16 Perino, supra note 14 at 4.  
17 Richard B. Schmitt, Michael Schroeder & Shailagh Murray, Corporate Oversight Bill 
Passes, Eases Path for Investor Lawsuits, WALL ST. J., July 26, 2002, at A1. 
18 Id.
19 Michael A. Perino, Enron’s Legislative Aftermath: Some Reflections on the Deterrence 
Aspects of the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002, 76 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 671, 693 (2002).  
20 Compare In re Heritage Bond Litig., 289 F.Supp 2d 1132, 1148 (“[The amended 
statute of limitations] cannot apply to claims already barred at the time of its enactment, 
regardless of the filing date.”) and Roberts v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 2003 WL 
1936116 at 3 (M.D.Fla.) (“The section by its plain terms, applies to any and all cases 
filed after the effective date of the Act, regardless of when the underlying conduct 
occurred”). 
5due to the language of the Act.21 Guided by a test the Supreme Court developed in 
Landgraf v. USI Film Products, courts across the country worked to determine if the 
statute applied retroactively.22 
This Comment clarifies the issues presented by the SOX statute of limitations and 
analyzes the current case law on the subject.23 Part II of this Comment provides a 
historical background to securities fraud legislation and litigation and endeavors to shed 
light on the back and forth play between the legislature and judiciary involving securities 
fraud claims, specifically claims made under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934.24 Part III introduces and examines the existing method used to determine 
when retroactive application is permissible.25 Part IV explores the effect of the current 
methodology when applied to the SOX statute of limitations by surveying the existing 
case law on the subject, and Part V carries this analysis to its logical conclusion by 
presenting arguments in favor of retroactive application.26 Finally, and foremost, the Act 
remains highly significant and holds many future implications for the courts, including 
the U.S. Supreme Court.27 For the reasons set forth below, the courts should hold in 
favor of retroactive application and mend the holes their peers have worn into SOX 
through improper use.28 
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF SECTION 10(B) SECURITIES FRAUD LITIGATION 
A. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
 
Congress responded several decades ago to the stock market crash of 1929 by 
enacting the Securities Exchange Acts of 1933 and 1934 much the same way they 
responded to the devastating collapse of Enron and WorldCom by enacting SOX.29 
21 Compare Friedman v. Rayovac Corp., 295 F.Supp.2d 957, 976 (2003) (holding a claim 
filed after the effective date adding a party to a time-barred claim filed before the 
effective date of the Act called for the application of the amended statute of limitations) 
and Glaser v. Enzo Biochem, Inc., 303 F.Supp 2d 724, 734 (2003) (holding the statute of 
limitations applied to actions that may have accrued, but not actions that were previously 
time barred).  
22 A.I.G. Asian Infrastructure Fund, L.P. v. Chase Manhattan Asia, Ltd., J.P., 2004 WL 
3095844 (S.D.N.Y.); In re Royal Ahold N.V. Sec. & ERISA Litig., 351 F.Supp.2d 334, 
334 (2004) (citing Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244 (1994)).  
23 See discussion infra Parts II - VI.  
24 See discussion infra Part II.  
25 See discussion infra Part III. 
26See discussion infra Parts IV, V.  
27 See discussion infra Part V-VI.  
28 See discussion infra Part VI.  
29 Compare Lucci, supra note 3, at 212 (describing the financial concerns that triggered 
the enactment of SOX), and Peter J. McCarthy, The Constitutionality of Section 27A of 
the Securities and Exchange At of 1934: Congressional Response to the Upheaval of the 
Lampf decision, 20 J. Legis. 235, 238 (1994) (describing the financial concerns which 
triggered the enactment of the Securities Exchange Acts of 1933 and 1934).   
6The 1929 crash in a large part occurred due to speculation associated with the value of 
stock. Through various fraudulent schemes, the entire stock system, as it existed, 
collapsed in 1929. To prevent another crash, Congress acted swiftly and enacted two 
major regulatory acts in two years. The 1933 Act regulates the actions of corporations 
who issue stock. The 1934 Act is primarily concerned with regulating secondary resellers 
and requiring corporations to file periodic reports as to the condition and financial future 
of their corporations.30 
Section 804(b) of SOX addresses claims made under Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act.31 
Significant debate exists as to whether the extended statute of limitations also applies to 
Sections 11 and 12(a) of the 1933 Act.32 
This Comment primarily focuses on claims made under Section 10(b) of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.33 Section 10(b) addresses securities fraud claims 
brought about due to the employment of manipulative and deceptive devices.34 Section 
10(b) does not include a statute of limitations because Congress did not originally intend 
the rule to allow for private suits.35 Courts interpreting Section 10(b) established an 
implied cause of action authorizing private litigants to pursue individual claims against 
companies who engage in acts that contravene Section 10(b).36 
In the absence of an express statute of limitations for federal law claims, courts 
utilize the traditional practice of borrowing the law of the forum state to supply a statute 
of limitations period.37 During 1980s, numerous insider trading scandals led to class-
action lawsuits and multidistrict Section 10(b) claims.38 The question of which state’s 
statute of limitations to apply presented a complex problem, and the time came for the 
Supreme Court to clarify the issue.39 
30 McCarthy, supra note 29, at 238.  
31 Compare Perino, supra note 14, at 4 (arguing that Section 804(b) of SOX may apply to 
claims under Sections 11 and 12(a) of the Securities Act of 1933 because a number of 
courts have found that claims brought under these sections “sound in fraud”), and John C. 
Coffee, Jr., A Brief Tour of the Major Reforms in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, SH097 ALI-
ABA 151, 174 (2002) (arguing that Section 804(b) of SOX does not apply to claims 
brought under Sections 11 and 12(a) because claims brought under these sections do not 
involve fraud, but rather a lesser claim of material nondisclosure).  
32 Perino, supra note 14, at 4.  
33 See discussion infra Parts III - VI.  
34 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2000). 
35 McCarthy, supra note 29, at 239. 
36 McCarthy, supra note 29, at 239. In Kardon v. Nat’l Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp 798 
(E.D. Pa. 1947), a federal court ruled that the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 contained 
an implied right of action under Section 10(b). Joseph F. Morrissy, Catching The 
Culprits: Is Sarbanes – Oxley Enough?, 2003 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 801, 810 (2003).  
37 McCarthy, supra note 29, at 239 (citing Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 395 
(1946)).  
38 McCarthy, supra note 29, at 239. 
39 McCarthy, supra note 29, at 240; See also Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow 
v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350, 352 (1991) (holding that state-borrowing principles should 
be applied to causes of action implied under a statute which also contains an express 
cause of action with an analogous statute of limitations).  
7B.  The Supreme Court Sets a Uniform Statute of Limitations: Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, 
Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson 
 
1. Statutes of Limitations and Repose  
 
Due to conflicting opinions among the Circuits and the complicated problem of 
choosing the proper limitations period for Section 10(b) securities fraud claims, the 
Supreme Court granted certiorari to address the important issue in Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, 
Purpis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson (Lampf), a case arising out of the Ninth Circuit.40 
Justice Blackmun delivered the opinion of the court in which Justices Rehnquist, White, 
Marshall, and Scalia joined.41 Relying on precedent, the Court employed a hierarchical 
inquiry to ascertain the appropriate limitations period for Section 10(b) claims.42 
The inquiry applied by the Court requires three separate determinations.43 First, 
the Court must determine whether the federal cause of action tends to encompass various, 
diverse topics and subtopics making it impossible to consistently apply one statute of 
limitations period within a jurisdiction.44 Second, assuming a standardized limitations 
period was suitable, the Court must determine whether a state or federal source should 
provide this period.45 Finally, keeping in mind that a presumption exists in favor of state 
borrowing, the Court must determine if there is an analogous federal source that affords a 
“closer fit” with the cause of action at issue than any state-law source.46 The Court 
proceeded to apply the hierarchical inquiry to the Section 10(b) claim in question.47 
In analyzing the claim before it, the Court determined with regard to the first 
question of the hierarchical inquiry that the use of differing state statutes would present 
the danger of forum shopping, and the interests of predictability and judicial economy 
called for the adoption of one, consistent source.48 Answering the second and third 
questions of the hierarchical inquiry, the Court “conclude[d] that where, as here, the 
claim asserted is one implied under a statute that also contains an express cause of action 
with its own time limitation, a court should look first to the statute of origin to ascertain 
the proper limitations period.”49 The statute of origin for Section 10(b) securities fraud 
claims is the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.50 
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 encompasses various provisions outlining 
multiple causes of action with differing statutes of limitation.51 The Solicitor General, in 
 
40 Lampf, 501 U.S. at 354.  
41 Id. at 351.  
42 Id. at 356.  
43 Id. at 357. 
44 Id. (citing Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 273 (1945)).  
45 Id.
46 Id.
47 Id. at 359. 
48 See id. at 357. 
49 Id. at 359.   
50 Id. at 359-60.  
51 Jon B. Streeter & Peter E. Root, An Overview of the Civil Liability Provisions of the 
Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, in PRACTISING LAW 
8an amicus brief submitted on behalf of the Securities and Exchange Commission urged 
the Court to apply the five-year statute of repose incorporated into Section 20A of the Act 
by the Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988.52 The Court 
disagreed with the Commission and determined instead that Section 9 of the Act 
pertaining to willful manipulation of securities prices was sufficiently analogous and 
more appropriately applied to Section 10(b) claims.53 Section 9 of the Act states: “No 
action shall be maintained to enforce any liability created under this section, unless 
brought one year after discovery of the facts constituting the violation and within three 
years after such violation.”54 The Securities and Exchange Commission argued the 
adoption of the three year period of repose would frustrate the purpose of Section 10(b).55 
The Court, however, asserted that the inclusion of the one- and three-year arrangement in 
the broad collection of express securities actions included in the 1933 and 1934 Acts 
supports a congressional decision that the three-year period is adequate.56 Claims made 
pursuant to Section 10(b) must therefore be initiated within one year of discovery and 
within three years after such violation.57 
2. Retroactive Application 
 
Apart from establishing statutes of limitation and repose for Section 10(b) 
securities fraud claims, Lampf produced substantial controversy by announcing without 
any analysis that these new statutes were to be applied retroactively to bar claims pending 
at the time of the decision.58 The Court reversed the decision of the Ninth Circuit Court 
of Appeals regarding the particular Section 10(b) claim presented in Lampf.59 While 
timely under Ninth Circuit authority, the respondents’ claim was dismissed due to the 
statutes introduced by the Court upon review.60 Justice O’Connor sharply criticized this 
result in her dissent stating: “In holding that respondents’ suit is time barred under a 
limitations period that did not exist before today, the Court departs drastically from our 
established practice and inflicts an injustice on the respondents.”61 She argued precedent 
clearly and accurately demonstrated the case was not time-barred.62 
INSTITUTE, CORPORATE LAW AND PRACTICE COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES (No. B4-7094), 
at 460 (1995).  
52 Lampf, 501 U.S. at 355.   
53 Id. at 360.  
54 Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78i(e) (2005)). 
55 Id. at 362.  The principle purposes of Section 10(b) include combating fraud and 
protecting investors. John L. Musewicz, Vicarious Employer Liability and Section 10(b): 
In Defense of the Common Law, 50 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 754, 777 (1982). 
56 Lampf, 501 U.S. at 362 (citing Ceres Partners v. GEL Assocs., 918 F.2d 329, 363 (2d 
Cir. 1990).  
57 Id. at 364. 
58 See McCarthy, supra note 29, at 240.  
59 Lampf, 501 U.S. at 364. 
60 Id.
61 Id. at 369 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
62 Id. (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
9In her dissent, Justice O’Connor cited several cases to support her argument 
including Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson.63 In Chevron, the Court employed a method known 
as pure prospectivity.64 According to the pure prospectivity methodology, “[t]he case is 
decided under the old law but becomes a vehicle for announcing the new, effective with 
respect to all conduct or events occurring after the date of that decision.”65 Chevron also 
outlined three factors to consider when dealing with the non-retroactivity question: (1) 
Does the decision overrule clear past precedent, (2) does it retard the effect or purpose of 
the rule, and (3) does it produce substantial inequitable results?66 Applying the Chevron 
factors, Justice O’Connor reasoned; first, the Court overrules plainly established circuit 
precedent.67 Second, the Court makes clear that the federal interest in predictability 
requires a uniform standard, but to retroactively apply a statute of limitations period that 
the respondents could not have anticipated lacks predictability.68 Third, inequitable 
results are obvious.69 She condemned the fact that the Court chose to ignore the 
retroactivity issue, thereby unfairly burdening the respondents.70 
The same day the Supreme Court announced its decision in Lampf, the Court also 
announced its decision in James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia.71 In a plurality 
opinion, the Court held in Beam that once the Court has applied a new rule of law to 
litigants in one case it must do so with respect to all others not barred by procedural 
requirements or res judicata.72 In his concurring opinion, Justice Scalia advanced the 
notion that the pure prospective methodology of Chevron was unconstitutional in the 
sense that it amounted to an advisory opinion, and that the concept of judicial review 
constrained the Court to consider only the case that was actually before it.73 Though 
Beam was not relied upon by the majority in Lampf, several circuits later held Beam 
mandated retroactive application of the Lampf statutes of limitation and repose to Section 
10(b) securities fraud claims.74 
63 Id. at 373 (citing Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97 (1971)) (O’Connor, J., 
dissenting). 
64 James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 536 (1991).  
65 Id. (citing Chevron, 404 U.S. at 97 (1971)).  
66 Chevron, 404 U.S. at 106.  
67 Lampf, 501 U.S. at 373 (citing Chevron, 404 U.S. at 97) (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
68 Id. (citing Chevron, 404 U.S. at 97) (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
69 Id. (citing Chevron, 404 U.S. at 97) (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
70 Id. at 374 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).  
71 Compare id. at 350 (announcing the Supreme Court’s holding on June 20, 1991), and
James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia , 501 U.S. 529, 529 (announcing the Supreme 
Court’s holding on June 20, 1991).  
72 Beam, 501 U.S. at 544.  
73 Id. at 547 (Scalia, J., concurring opinion). 
74 McCarthy, supra note 29, at 244 (stating that the Second, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits 
held Beam mandated retroactive application of the Lampf statutes of limitation).  
10
C. Congressional Response to Lampf 
 
1. Statutes of Limitations and Repose  
 
The Supreme Court holding in Lampf resulted in the dismissal of numerous 
private Section 10(b) actions against the ringleaders of major financial scandals including 
Charles Keeting, Michael Milken, and others.75 Congress and the SEC believed these 
dismissals would negatively affect the enforcement process.76 SEC chairman Richard 
Breeden endorsed a Senate bill that would overturn the Lampf decision and allow 
litigants more time to bring Section 10(b) claims in U.S. courts.77 Breeden stated in a 
public address: “The Commission shares the concern of Justice [Anthony] Kennedy in his 
dissent [in Lampf] that an overly stringent statue of limitations may undermine investors’ 
ability to recover damages for fraud under the Act.”78 Congress soon began to churn out 
new legislation with the hope of purging the devastating effects of Lampf.79 
Democratic Senator Richard Bryan of Nevada introduced a bill that proposed a 
two-year statute of limitations and five-year statute of repose applicable to all judicially 
implied rights of action under the federal securities law.80 Despite the call to action from 
individual members of the Senate and the SEC, Congress failed to reach a conclusive 
agreement and instead resolved the issue by creating a provision that overturned the 
Lampf decision.81 The provision eventually passed as Section 476 of the Deposit 
Insurance Reform and Tax Payer Protection Act of 1991 and later became Section 27A of 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.82 
2. Retroactive Application 
 
Section 27A of the Securities Exchange Act, signed into law by President George 
H.W. Bush on December 19, 1991, eliminated the retroactive effect of the Lampf 
decision.83 The pertinent part of Section 27A, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa-1(b), entitled effect on 
dismissed causes of action, provides:  
Any private civil action implied under 78j(b) of this title [§ 10(b) of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934] that was commenced on or before June 19, 1991- (1) which was 
dismissed as time barred subsequent to June 19, 1991, and (2) which would have been 
timely filed under the limitation period provided by the laws applicable in the 
jurisdiction, including principles of retroactivity, as such laws existed on June 19, 1991, 
 
75 McCarthy, supra note 29, at 246 n. 110 (quoting 137 CONG. REC. H11, 811 (daily ed. 
Nov. 26, 1991) (Statement of Rep. Dingell)).  
76 McCarthy, supra note 29, at 247. 
77 23 Sec. Reg. & L.Rep. (BNA) 1141 (July 26, 1991). 
78 Id.
79 See id.
80 Id.
81 Erica Gann, Judicial Action in Retrograde: The Case for Applying Section 804 of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act to All Fraud Actions under the Securities Laws, 72 U. CIN. L. REV.
1043, 1053 (2004).  
82 Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211 (1995).  
83 See id.
11
shall be reinstated on motion by the plaintiff not later than 60 days after December 19, 
1991.84 
Soon after Section 27A was signed into law, several litigants previously turned away due 
to the Lampf and Beam decisions filed motions to reinstate their previously dismissed 
claims.85 
D. The Supreme Court Fires Back:  Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc.  
 
One of the many claims Section 27A(b) aimed to reinstate made its way to the 
Supreme Court from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky 
as Plaut v. Spendthrift Farms, Inc..86 The district court originally found the petitioners’ 
claims untimely under the Lampf rule and dismissed them with prejudice.87 The 
petitioners did not file an appeal, and the judgment became final thirty days later.88 Upon 
the enactment of Section 27A, petitioners filed a motion to reinstate.89 The motion met 
the conditions set forth in the Act, and therefore, the court was required to grant it.90 
Instead, the district court refused to reinstate the claim holding Section 27A(b) was 
unconstitutional, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.91 
After a lengthy historical analysis, Justice Scalia delivered the Court’s majority 
opinion which held that Section 27A(b) violated the Constitution’s separation of 
powers.92 Justice Scalia rationalized that when retroactive legislation necessitates the 
application of new legislation to the final judgment of a formerly adjudicated case, it 
essentially reverses a determination previously made, in the case.93 The decisions of 
Article III courts “are final and conclusive upon the rights of the parties.”94 Justice Scalia 
remarked upon the impudence of Congress in attempting to set aside final judgments by 
stating: “Apart from the statute we review[ed] today, we know no instance in which 
Congress has attempted to set aside the final judgment of an Article III court by 
retroactive legislation. That prolonged reticence would be amazing if such interference 
were not understood to be constitutionally proscribed.”95 Perhaps discouraged by the 
decision in Plaut, Congress failed to act again regarding Section 10(b) securities fraud 
claims until the passage of SOX in 2002.96 
84 15 U.S.C. § 78aa-1(b) (2005).  
85 See Plaut, 514 U.S. at 215.  
86 Id.
87 Id. at 214.  
88 Id. at 215. 
89 Id.
90 Id.
91 Id.
92 Id. at 211.  
93 Id. at 225 (quoting The Federalist No. 81, at 545).  
94 Id. at 226 (quoting United States v. O’Grady, 89 U.S. 641, 647-48 (1875)).  
95 Id. at 230. 
96 See Gann, supra note 81, at 1054.  It should be noted that in late December1995, 
Congress passed the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA) over a 
veto by President Clinton. William S. Learch, Private Securities Litigation Reform Act 
1995 – 1 ½ Years Later, 1005 PLI/Corp 569 (1997). The act resulted in higher pleading 
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E. Congress Tries Again: The Sarbanes-Oxley Act  
 
1. Statutes of Limitation and Repose  
 
SOX, approved in response to the financial scandals predominantly embodied by 
the collapse of Enron, is possibly one of the most illustrious and comprehensive pieces of 
legislation passed in decades.97 The Act was passed in a near unanimous vote by 
Congress, and President Bush quickly signed it into law calling it one of the “most far-
reaching reforms of American business practices since the time of Franklin Delano 
Roosevelt.”98 Legislative history reveals that in addition to remedying corporate fraud, 
Congress intended the Act to overrule the 5-4 Lampf decision that established one- and 
three-year statutes of limitations and repose for Section 10(b) securities fraud claims.99 
Section 804 of the Act sets out statutes of limitation and repose for “a private 
right of action that involves a claim of fraud, deceit, manipulation, or contrivance in 
contravention of a regulatory requirement concerning the securities laws, as defined in 
section 3(a)(47) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78c(a)(47)).”100 
Senator Patrick Leahy introduced Section 804 as part of Senate Bill 2010, the Corporate 
and Criminal Fraud Accountability Act.101 The Section lengthens the judicially implied 
one- and three-year statutory scheme stating: These actions “may be brought not later 
than the earlier of— (1) 2 years after the discovery of the facts constituting the violation; 
or (2) 5 years after such violation.”102 The justification offered for lengthening the statute 
of limitations was that an extended period would allow defrauded investors a better 
opportunity to recover losses in cases where those responsible for the fraud concealed 
it.103 
standards, automatic discovery, damage limitations, and a host of other procedural 
safeguards to prevent excessive securities fraud claims. Id. Most experts contend the 
presumption against retroactivity applies in the case of the PSLRA because the language 
of the act states: “The amendments made by title shall not affect or apply to any private 
action . . . commenced before and pending on [Dec. 22, 1995].” Id. (quoting Pub. L. No. 
104-67, §108, 109 Stat. 737, 758 (1995)).  
97 See Gann, supra note 81, at 1043.  
98 Perino, supra note 19, at 671.  
99 S. REP. NO. 107-146, at 7 (2002) (statement of Sen. Leahy). 
As Justices O’Connor and Kennedy said in their dissent in [Lampf], the 5-4 Supreme 
Court decision … the current ‘one and three’ limitations period makes securities fraud 
actions ‘all but a dead letter for injured investors who by no conceivable standard of 
fairness or practicality can be expected to file suit within three years after the violation 
occurred.  
Id. 
100 28 U.S.C. § 1658(b) (2005).  
101 S. REP. NO. 107-146, at 12 (2002). 
102 28 U.S.C. § 1658(b) (2005). 
103 Perino, supra note 19, at 689.  
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2. Retroactive Application  
 
The following passages explore the controversy surrounding the question of 
retroactive application of the extended statute of limitations to Section 10(b) securities 
fraud claims.104 SOX passed swiftly and contained vital provisions added by floor 
amendments without hearings.105 Many experts predicted that the Act would house 
several ambiguities and give way to unintended consequences.106 Controversy developed 
around the following issues including, among other things, the introduction of 
professional standards for attorneys and the statute of limitations.107 Recently, even one 
of the sponsors of the Act, Congressman Michael Oxley, commented that it was an 
imperfect document because it was hurried through in the “hothouse atmosphere” 
following the demise of WorldCom.108 The speed with which the “corporate 
responsibility bill juggernaut”109 raced through Congress did not bode well for future 
litigation.110 
In a note to 28 U.S.C. § 1658, Section 804(b) of SOX established an effective 
date for the extended statute of limitations.111 The note reads, “the limitations period 
provided by section 1658(b) of title 28, United States Code, as added by this section, 
shall apply to all proceedings addressed by this section that are commenced on or after 
the date of enactment of this Act [July 30, 2002].”112 Two distinct arguments arise due to 
the wording of this section.113 Thus far, courts have almost consistently held that claims 
previously time barred under the old statutory scheme were not revived by the new 
 
104 See discussion infra Parts IV-V.  
105 Coffee, supra note 31, at 171-72.  
106 Coffee, supra note 31, at 171-72.  
107 Coffee, supra note 31, at 171-72.  
108 Andrew Parker & Sundeep Tucker, Sarbanes-Oxley Reforms 'Go Too Far', Says 
Author, Financial Times (London, England), July 8, 2005, pg 6 (quoting Rep. Michael 
Oxley). 
109 Elisabeth Bumiller, Corporate Conduct: The President; Bush Signs Bill Aimed at 
Fraud in Corporations, N.Y. Times, July 31, 2002, at A1. 
110 See Coffee, supra note 30, at 171-72.   
111 Pub. L. No.107-204, § 804(b), 2002 U.S.C.C.A.N. (116 Stat.) (to be codified at 28 
U.S.C. § 1658). 
112 Id.
113 Compare In re Enter. Mortgage Acceptance Co., 391 F.3d 401, 411 (2004) (“Congress 
did not clearly provide for retroactive application of Section 804 of Sarbanes Oxley.”), 
and Brief of The Securities and Exchange Commission at 8, AIG Asian Infrastructure 
Fund, L.P. v. Chase Manhattan Asia Ltd, 2004 WL 3095844 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (No. 02-
CV-10034(KMW)) [hereinafter Brief] (“The Supreme Court and two courts of appeals 
have held that when Congress uses language like that found in Section 804(b), the new 
statute of limitations period not only applies retroactively to claims arising pre-
enactment, but also revives barred claims.”).  
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amended statutes.114 Others have argued, Congressional intent found in the legislative 
history prescribes that the statute applies retroactively.115 Some courts dissect the issue 
further claiming the language of the Act provides for limited retroactive application for 
the earlier of two years after discovery of the fraud or five years after the fraudulent 
conduct that occurred before enactment, emphasizing the importance of inquiry notice 
and discovery.116 Clearly this presents a need for uniformity, but the pursuit of 
uniformity must not be attempted at the expense of justice.  
 
III. RETROACTIVE ANALYSIS 
Before addressing the confusion presented by the wording of Section 804 of SOX, 
it is proper to note that significant confusion exists in the concept of retroactivity in 
general and what constitutes retroactive effect.117 Retroactivity is formally defined as 
encompassing two distinct concepts.118 First, ‘true retroactivity’ entails the application of 
a new law to an act or transaction which was completed prior to the enactment of the new 
law.119 Second, ‘quasi-retroactivity’ arises when a new law is applied to an act or 
transaction not yet completed at the time of enactment.120 The following passages and 
the cases which analyze the issue explore the concept of true retroactivity with respect to 
Section 804 of SOX.121 
Congress may constitutionally apply an extended statute of limitations period 
retroactively122 In fact, Congress may even enact a new statute of limitations to revive 
claims barred under a prior rule.123 But while Congress has this power, it must 
unambiguously state that the law applies retroactively.124 The majority of courts 
determining the issue of retroactivity with respect to the statute of limitations amended by 
 
114 Enter. Mortgage, 391, F.3d at 401; In re ADC Telecomm., Inc. Sec. Litig., 409, F.3d 
974, 979 (8th Cir. 2005); Foss v. Bear Sterns & Co., Inc., 394 F.3d 540, 542 (7th Cir. 
2005).   
115 Roberts v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 2003 WL 1936116 at 4.  
116 Tello v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. 410 F.3d 1275, 1282-83 (11th Cir. 2005).  
117 Compare In re Enron, 2004 WL 405886 at 15 (“[A] statute does not have retroactive 
effect merely because it is applied to conduct occurring prior to its enactment.”), and In 
re ADC, 409 F.3d at 978 (“[A]nytime new legislation applies to causes of action that 
have accrued prior to the enactment of the legislation, it has retroactive effect.”).  
118 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1343 (8th ed. 2004). 
119 Id.
120 Id.
121 See, In re Enter. Mortgage Acceptance Co., 391 F.3d 401, 411 (2004).  
122 Int’l Union of Elec. Radio & Mach. Workers, AFL-CIO v. Robbins & Meyers, Inc., 
429 U.S. 229, 244 (1976).  
123 Chase Sec. Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 311-12 (1945).  
124 Glaser v. Enzo Biochem, Inc., 303 F. Supp 2d 724, 734 (citing INS v. St. Cyr, 533 
U.S. 289, 317 (2001)).  
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SOX applied a “three-step analysis” developed by the Supreme Court in Landgraf v. USI 
Film Products.125 
A. The Three-Step Analysis: Landgraf v. USI Film Products  
 
When a case involves a federal statute enacted following the incident in the suit, 
the Court introduced a three-step analysis in Landgraf for making a conclusion as to 
retroactivity (the three-step analysis).126 First, a court must determine whether Congress 
has expressly provided for the statute’s proper reach.127 In Landgraf, the Court found the 
words “pending on or commenced after the date of enactment” to be a clear expression of 
Congressional intent for the statute to apply retroactively.128 If Congress has done so, a 
court need not resort to the judicial default rules.129 Second, if the statute contains no 
explicit rule, a court must resolve whether the new statute would have retroactive 
effect.130 Several courts have described the second step of the three-step analysis “as an 
inquiry into whether the statutory change affects substantive or procedural rights.”131 
Retroactive effect occurs when a newly enacted statute either, impairs the rights a party 
possessed when he acted, enhances a party’s liability for past acts, or imposes new 
obligations with regard to transactions already completed.132 Third, if the statute imposes 
retroactive effects, traditional presumptions dictate it does not apply absent clear 
congressional intent.133 
Landgraf involved a sexual harassment challenge under Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964.134 Petitioner Barbara Landgraf claimed that while employed at a USI 
Film Products plant in Tyler, Texas, she suffered repeated harassment due to 
inappropriate remarks made by a fellow employee.135 The district court dismissed the 
claim finding that Landgraf’s employer had adequately remedied the situation.136 While 
Landgraf awaited appeal, the President signed the Civil Rights Act of 1991 into law.137 
Section 102 of the Civil Rights Act contained provisions establishing a right to obtain 
compensatory and punitive damages for a violation of Title VII and allowed for a jury 
 
125 In re ADC Telecomm., Inc. Sec. Litig., 409, F.3d 974, 979 (8th Cir. 2005); Enter. 
Mortgage, 391 F.3d at 405. 
126 See Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 280 (1994). 
127 Id.
128William M. Prifti, Securities: Public and Private Offerings Database updated 
September 2005, at 3 available at SECPUBPRIV S 11:34.50. 
129 Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 280.  
130 Id.
131In re Enter. Mortgage Acceptance Co., 391 F.3d 401, 411 (2004). 
132 Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 280.  
133 Id.
134 Id. at 248.  
135 Id.
136 Id.
137 Id. at 249.
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trial if these types of damages were asserted.138 After introducing the above multipart 
test and analyzing the language of the Act accordingly, the Court determined the 
provisions of the new act did not apply retroactively to Landgraf’s claim because 
Congress did not expressly prescribe retroactive application of Section 102.139 
B. Working the Steps  
 
The first step of the analysis seems rather straightforward, but courts differ in 
exactly what type of language expressly prescribes a statute’s proper reach.140 The 
statutory language at issue in Landgraf consisted of the following: “Except as otherwise 
specifically provided, this Act and the amendments made by this Act shall take effect 
upon enactment.”141 The Court found this language lacked the kind of unambiguous 
directive required to permit retroactive application and thus, turned to an analysis of the 
legislative history to ascertain congressional intent.142 Congress originally attempted to 
pass the Act in 1990.143 The language of the 1990 Act contained an express provision for 
retroactivity144 The President vetoed the 1990 legislation, referring to the bill’s “unfair 
retroactivity rules” as a basis for his disapproval.145 Congress failed to override the veto, 
and instead introduced the 1991 legislation without the provision for retroactivity.146 
The fact that such language was noticeably absent from the 1991 Act cannot reasonably 
be attributed to ignorance of the retroactivity issue.147 Rather, it appears more evident 
that the absence of the retroactive language resulted from a compromise that made it 
possible to enact the 1991 version.148 Thus, one may argue the existence of clear 
 
138 Jennifer R. Yelin, Retroactivity Revisited: A Critical Appraisal of CERCLA’s 
Retroactive Liability Scheme in Light of Landgraf v. USI Film Products and Eastern 
Enterprises v. Apfel, 8 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 94, 110 (1999).  
139 Id. at 111.  
140 Compare Int’l Union of Elec. Radio & Mach. Workers, AFL-CIO v. Robbins & 
Meyers, Inc., 429 U.S. 229, 241-44 (1976) (holding that language stating “[t]he 
amendments made by this Act . . . shall be applicable with respect to all charges pending . 
. . on the date of enactment of this Act and all charges filed thereafter” applied to charges 
previously time barred and “provide[d] for retroactive application of the extended 
limitations period”), and In re Worldcom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 2004 WL 1435356 (S.D.N.Y.) 
(requiring explicit language and finding that “[t]here is no explicit language in the statute 
stating that is applies retroactively or that is operates to revive time-barred claims”).  
141 Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 257.  
142 Id. at 255-56.  
143 Id. at 255.  
144 Id.
145 Id. at 255-56 (quoting President’s Message to the Senate Returning Without Approval 
the Civil Rights Act of 1990, 6 Weekly Comp.Pres.Doc. 1632,1634 (Oct. 22, 1990), 
reprinted in 136 Cong. Rec. S16418, S16419).  
146 Id. at 256. 
147 Id.
148 Id.
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congressional intent against retroactive application of the Act, but the Court pushed on to 
the second step in the analysis.149 
When turning to the second step in the three-step analysis, the Court advanced the 
notion that there is a deeply rooted presumption against retroactive legislation.150 This 
deeply rooted presumption against statutory retroactivity developed due to the perceived 
unfairness implicit when imposing new burdens on parties after the fact.151 In actuality, a 
contrary rule existed in common law that called for retroactive application of statutes that 
removed a burden from the parties.152 The presumption against retroactivity conflicts 
with another well known axiom that the “court is to apply the law in effect at the time it 
renders its opinion.”153 If the Court applied this latter principle in Landgraf, the Act 
would apply retroactively to the claim.154 Courts commonly find “apparent tension” 
amid differing canons of statutory construction.155 Therefore, courts must determine if 
applying the statute retroactively leads to impermissible consequences.156 
Impermissible consequences are found in every statute which impairs vested 
rights obtained under existing laws, or imposes a new duty or disability with respect to 
transactions which have already taken place.157 The Court must ask whether the Act 
attaches new legal consequences to events that occurred prior to its enactment, but even 
the potential unfairness of applying civil legislation retroactively does not justify the 
Court’s failure to give the statute its intended scope.158 The Court in Landgraf 
determined that the provisions for punitive and compensatory damages set forth in the 
new Civil Rights Act, if applied retroactively, would impose a new disability and attach 
new legal burdens to conduct that occurred before the Act became effective.159 These 
impermissible effects led the Court to hold that the Civil Rights Act of 1991 did not 
operate retroactively, and therefore, according to the third step of the analysis it did not 
govern petitioner Landgraf’s claim due to the absence of clear congressional intent.160 
Justice Blackmun found much at fault with the reasoning of the majority, and in 
his dissent, he argued the decision “extends the presumption against retroactivity beyond 
its historical reach and purpose.”161 Justice Blackmun believed the most natural reading 
of the statute and a straightforward textual analysis of the Act indicated that the 
 
149 See id.
150 Id. at 265.  
151 Id. at 270. 
152 Id. (citing United States v. Chambers, 291 U.S. 217, 223-24 (1934)).  
153 Id. at 264 (quoting Bradley v. School Bd. of Richmond, 416 U.S. 696 (1964)).  
154 See id.
155 Id. at 263 (citing Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and 
The Rules or Canons About How Statutes are to be Construed, 3 VAND. L.REV. 395
(1950)).  
156 Id. at 268-69. 
157 Id. at 269 (quoting Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386, 1 L.Ed. 648 (1789)). 
158 Id. at 269-70. 
159 Id. at 281-84. 
160 Id. at 286. 
161 Id. at 294 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).  
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provisions of Section 102 applied to cases pending on appeal at the time of enactment.162 
He too advanced a traditional canon of construction: “[T]he starting point for 
interpretation of a statute, is the language of the statute itself.”163 
IV. RETROACTIVITY AND SOX: AN ANALYSIS OF EXISTING CASE LAW  
President Bush signed the SOX into law in the congressional election year of 
2002.164 Accused as sluggish in his response to financial scandals and motivated by 
plunging stock prices and concerns voters would hold him and fellow republicans 
accountable, many democrats pointed out that the President had been corralled into 
supporting the Act.165 At the signing, the President remarked that “tricking an investor 
into taking a risk is theft by another name.”166 Many wondered, including Senator Tom 
Daschle, Democratic majority leader, why then had the Justice Department, as of yet, 
failed to indict executives at Enron nearly eight months after the corporation’s 
bankruptcy.167 Would private individuals likely wait as long to file civil claims, and if so, 
would the extended statute of limitations increase their chances of recovery?  To which 
claims does the amended statute apply?  Litigation over the scope of the new section was 
certain.168 The United States District Court for the Central District of California issued 
the first opinion on the matter of retroactive application on January 6, 2003.169 
A. Out of the Starting Gates: In re Heritage Bond Litigation  
 
In re Heritage Bond Litigation involved an action against various defendants for 
making false and misleading statements in violation of Section 10(b) of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934.170 Heritage Entities issued twelve bond offerings between the 
years of 1997 and 1999 for the purported purpose of establishing and maintaining 
Alzheimer’s healthcare facilities, and as reflected in the Official Statement, the funds 
received from the sale of the bonds to investors were restricted solely to this purpose.171 
Instead, Heritage Entities, contrary to the terms of the Official Statements, shifted the 
proceeds of the bond offerings between several projects commingling and siphoning off 
the funds during transfer.172 The projects themselves were not self-sustaining but instead 
kept afloat with the money earned from new offerings.173 By 2002, the entire scheme 
 
162 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).  
163 Id. at 265 (quoting Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. Bonjorno, 494 U.S. 827, 837 
(1990)) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).  
164 15 U.S.C. § 7201 (2002).   
165 Bumiller, supra note 106, at A1  
166 Bumiller, supra note 106, at A1  
167 Bumiller, supra note 106, at A!  
168 Coffee, supra note 30, at 174.  
169 In re Heritage Bond Litig., 289 F.Supp.2d 1132, 1147 (2003).  
170 Id. at 1135.  
171 Id. at 1137. 
172 Id. at 1139. 
173 Id. at 1140.  
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collapsed and Heritage defaulted on the repayment of the bonds defrauding investors of 
nearly $25 million.174 
Plaintiffs filed the Section 10(b) claim prior to the passage of SOX, but then re-
filled an essentially identical claim, after the President signed the Act into law.175 The 
court began the task of interpreting which claims fell within the scope of the amended 
statute of limitations, remarking that the issue had not yet been addressed by the courts.176 
Without mentioning the three-step analysis established by Landgraf, or analyzing the 
effect of the Act on a claim not previously filed, the court quoted Chenault v. United 
States Postal Service, a Ninth Circuit decision, in holding that a newly enacted statute of 
limitations may not be applied retroactively to revive previously time-barred claims.177 
The plaintiffs’ claim in Heritage expired according to the old three year statutory period 
before the enactment of Sarbanes Oxley.178 
B. Retroactivity Lives: Roberts v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.  
 
Of the first cases to determine the issue of retroactivity with respect to Section  
10(b) securities fraud claims, Roberts v. Dean Witter, remains one of the few to favor 
retroactive application.179 In Roberts, the defendant, Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, filed a 
motion to dismiss due to the fact that the underlying fraud occurred in 1998 and the 
plaintiffs would have been barred from asserting the claim under the prior statutory 
scheme.180 The plaintiffs argued the language of the Act was unambiguous and 
legislative history supported their contention that Congress meant the Act to apply 
retroactively.181 The court, first looking to statute itself, concluded the language of the 
Act, standing alone, afforded redress for violations occurring before the date of 
enactment.182 But noting that Congress did not specifically use the phrase retroactive 
application in the statute, the court turned next to examine the legislative history 
surrounding the passage of the Act.183 The legislative history lent much credibility to the 
 
174 Id.
175 Id. at 1148.  
176 Id.
177 Id. (quoting Chenault v. U.S. Postal Serv., 37 F.3d 535, 539 (9th Cir. 1994)) (“[A] 
newly enacted statute that lengthens the applicable statute of limitations may not be 
applied retroactively to revive a plaintiff’s claim that was otherwise barred under the old 
statutory scheme because to do so would ‘alter the substantive rights’ of a party and 
‘increase  party’s liability”)).  
178 Id.
179 Compare Roberts v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 2003 WL 1936116, at 3 (“The 
section by its plain terms, applies to any and all cases), with, e.g., Id.  at 1148 (“[The 
amended statute of limitations] cannot apply to claims already barred at the time of its 
enactment, regardless of the filing date”). 
180 Roberts, 2003 WL 1936116 at 3.  
181 Id.
182 Id.
183 Id.
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plaintiffs’ argument.184 The court focused on one particular statement by Senator Patrick 
Leahy: “[S]ection [804], by its plain terms, applies to any and all cases filed after the 
effective date of the Act, regardless of when the underlying conduct occurred.”185 The 
court denied defendant’s motion to dismiss but granted an interlocutory appeal to 
determine the controlling question of law—whether SOX revives time barred claims.186 
C. The Presumption Against Retroactivity Finds Overwhelming Support  
 
As of the date of this Comment, no United States district court has held that SOX 
revives previously time-barred Section 10(b) securities fraud claims, and the federal 
circuit courts seem to be heading in the same direction.187 The circuits that have decided 
the issue applied the three-step analysis and found an absence of clear congressional 
intent in the language of the Act.188 The Second Circuit rendered the first appellate 
decision on the issue in In re Enterprise Mortgage Acceptance Co..189 The Seventh and 
Eighth Circuits followed closely behind in their decisions in Foss v. Bear Stearns & Co. 
and In re ADC Telecommunications, Inc., respectively.190 
1. The Second Circuit: In re Enterprise Mortgage Acceptance Co. 
 
The appeal to the Second Circuit in Enterprise Mortgage involved cases arising 
from two different district courts.191 The circuit court did not formerly consolidate the 
cases for appeal but heard them on the same day and resolved them together due to the 
substantially identical issues.192 The cases involved Section 10(b) claims for allegedly 
misleading financial statements and private placements.193 In both instances, the 
plaintiffs filed prior to the passage of SOX but following the enactment, appended 
additional claims and joined an additional defendant to take advantage of the extended 
statute of limitations.194 
In applying the first step of the three-step analysis, the court concluded that the 
statute lacked the type of unambiguous language the Supreme Court has held would 
amount to an express retroactivity command.195 The statute failed to use the terms 
 
184 See id. 
185 Id. (quoting 148 Cong. Rec. S7418-01 (statement of Sen. Leahy) (emphasis added)).  
186 Id.
187 Prifti, supra note 125, at 1. 
188 Prifti, supra note 125, at 2.  
189 In re Enter. Mortgage Acceptance Co., 391 F.3d 401, 401 (2004). 
190 In re ADC Telecomm., Inc. Sec. Litig., 409, F.3d 974, 974 (8th Cir. 2005); Foss v. 
Bear Sterns & Co., Inc., 394 F.3d 540, 540 (7th Cir. 2005).   
191 Enter. Mortgage, 391 F.3d at 403. 
192 Id.
193 Prifti, supra note 125, at 2. 
194 Enter. Mortgage, 391 F.3d. at 403-04.  
195 Id. at 407.  
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“retroactive” or “revive.”196 The court also analyzed the wording of Section 804(c) 
which states: “Nothing in this section shall create a new, private right of action.”197 
While admitting that the plaintiffs’ argument that Section 804(c) was merely an 
expression that the statute of limitations was being enlarged without creating new types 
of claims was plausible, the court nevertheless concluded both the section setting forth 
the effective date, Section 804(b), and the section prohibiting the creation of new actions, 
Section 804(c) lacked clarity.198 The court stated that “[t]he requirement of congressional 
clarity . . . must be met both in order to overcome the presumption against retroactive 
application and to obviate the need for proceeding to the second stage of the three-step 
[analysis].”199 The plaintiffs continued to argue the second step of the three-step 
analysis, whether the statutory changes operated with retroactive effect, despite this 
determination by the court.200 
In arguing the second step of the three-step analysis, the plaintiffs took the 
position that the extension of a federal statute of limitations is both procedural in nature 
and retroactive.201 Relying on Vernon v. Cassadaga Valley Central School District, the 
plaintiffs asserted that retroactivity concerns generally do not bar the application of an 
extended statute of limitations.202 Vernon concerned a claim brought under the Age 
Discrimination and Employment Act (ADEA).203 Congress amended the statute of 
limitations applicable to filing a claim under the ADEA subsequent to the filing of the 
claim at issue.204 The court in Vernon, relying heavily on Landgraf, determined the 
statute applied retroactively because the statute of limitations applied not to the primary 
conduct of the defendants, but instead, to the secondary conduct of the plaintiffs in filing 
the suit.205 The statute when applied retroactively impaired no rights possessed by either 
party.206 The court in Enterprise Mortgage disregarded this argument finding that a 
statute of limitations can be substantive or procedural in nature and refused to create a 
categorical exception to Landgraf.207 The court considered the plaintiffs’ failure to prove 
clear congressional intent in the first step of the analysis fatal to their appeal.208 The 
 
196 Id. at 406-07 (quoting Pub. L. No.107-204, § 804(c), 2002 U.S.C.C.A.N. (116 Stat.) 
(to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1658)). 
197 Id. at 407 (quoting Pub. L. No.107-204, § 804(c), 2002 U.S.C.C.A.N. (116 Stat.) (to 
be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1658)). 
198 Id.
199 Id.
200 Prifti, supra note 125, at 2.  
201 Prifti, supra note 125, at 2.  
202 Enter. Mortgage, 391 F.3d at 408 (citing Vernon v. Cassadaga Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., 
49 F.3d 886, 890 (2d Cir. 1995)).  
203 Vernon, 49 F.3d at 888.  
204 Id.
205 Id. at 890.  
206 Id.
207 Enter. Mortgage, 391 F.3d. at 409. 
208 Prifti, supra note 125, at 2.  
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SOX amended statute of limitations would not revive previously time-barred claims filed 
in the Second Circuit.209 
2. The Seventh Circuit: Foss v. Bear Sterns & Co. 
 
The appeal to the Seventh Circuit in Foss involved a Section 10(b) claim against a 
securities broker for allegedly aiding and abetting the fraudulent concealment of an 
estate’s securities committed by the administrator in probate court.210 The court in Foss 
refused to analyze the retroactivity issue presented and merely remarked that the 
reasoning contained in the Enterprise Mortgage decision was persuasive.211 Relying 
solely on the decision issued by the Second Circuit in Enterprise Mortgage, the Seventh 
Circuit held that the extended statute of limitations did not revive previously time-barred 
Section 10(b) securities fraud claims.212 
3. The Eighth Circuit:  In re ADC Telecommunications Co. 
 
The appeal the Eighth Circuit in ADC involved a Section 10(b) claim alleging 
false and misleading statements made during the purchase of ADC stock.213 The 
Plaintiffs filed the initial complaint following the passage of SOX, but both parties agreed 
that the cause of action accrued in the months prior to the enactment, making it time-
barred under the old one- and three-year statutory scheme.214 The court began the task of 
working through the three-step analysis, only after recognizing the deeply rooted 
presumption against retroactivity stating: “[E]lementary considerations of fairness dictate 
that individuals should have an opportunity to know what the law is and to conform their 
conduct accordingly.”215 
In the first step of the analysis, the court found that while the language in Section 
804(b) of SOX was similar to the language endorsed by the Supreme Court as an explicit 
retroactivity command in Landgraf, Congress failed to include the words “pending on” 
found in the Landgraf statute.216 The court reasoned that a literal reading of the Act 
would permit a puzzling result, allowing the revival of stale claims filed after the passage 
of SOX while barring stale claims filed prior to the date of enactment.217 The fear of this 
result led the court to conclude the language created ambiguity as to the retroactive 
application of SOX.218 
Next, advancing to the second step of the three-step analysis, the Eighth Circuit 
agreed with the decisions in Chenault and the Second Circuit in Enterprise Mortgage 
209 Enter. Mortgage, 391 F.3d. at 410.  
210 Foss v. Bear Sterns & Co., Inc., 394 F.3d 540, 540 (7th Cir. 2005).   
211 Id. at 542 (citing Enter. Mortgage, 391 F.3d. at 410). 
212 Id. (citing Enter. Mortgage, 391 F.3d. at 410). 
213 In re ADC Telecomm., Inc. Sec. Litig., 409, F.3d 974, 975 (8th Cir. 2005).  
214 Id.
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holding that allowing the amended statute to revive stale claims would alter the 
substantive rights of a party.219 Three circuit courts now found the extended statute of 
limitations established by SOX failed to revive previously time-barred claims.220 These 
results seemed to indicate a growing consensus on the issue until the Eleventh Circuit, in 
a recently rendered opinion, indicated that it might permit the revival of stale claims.221 
D. Retroactivity Reborn in the Eleventh Circuit: Tello v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.  
 
The interlocutory appeal granted in Roberts moved to the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Eleventh Circuit as Tello v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. for the sole purpose of 
determining if the amended statute of limitations in SOX revived previously time-barred 
Section 10(b) securities fraud claims.222 The plaintiffs originally filed their complaint in 
November of 2002, following the passage of SOX, alleging that defendant Dean Witter 
deceptively contrived market prices of a certain stock by engaging in a short squeeze to 
maintain artificially high prices.223 The fraud occurred in 1998 making the action time 
barred under the original one-and three- year statute of limitations established by 
Lampf.224 The court of appeals reviewed de novo analyzing the issue according to the 
three-step analysis.225 
In applying the first step of the three-step analysis, the court determined that 
under a plain, facial reading of the Act, “there is built-in, limited retroactive application 
for the earlier of two years after discovery of the facts constituting securities fraud or five 
years after the fraudulent securities conduct that occurred prior to its enactment.”226 The 
court reviewed previous Supreme Court decisions that allowed the revival of expired 
claims under new, extended statutes of limitation with analogous language.227 The Tello 
court refused to attach any significance to the to absence of the word pending that the 
Eighth Circuit found so persuasive and concluded that the temporal reach of the statute 
inherently included fraud that occurred prior to enactment.228 They noted that the 
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Supreme Court has “repeatedly recognized that securities laws combating fraud should be 
construed not technically and restrictively, but flexibly to effectuate [their] remedial 
purpose.”229 Because the court deemed the temporal effect of the statute obvious from its 
language, they did not advance to the second or third steps of the three-step analysis.230 
The Tello court failed to issue a final opinion.231 Instead, it remanded the case to 
the district court for a factual determination concerning when the plaintiffs had sufficient 
inquiry notice to file their claim.232 The court explained that if the plaintiffs were 
sufficiently on inquiry notice prior to the enactment of SOX, the claim would be time 
barred under the old statutory scheme.233 The district court has yet to make the 
determination, and the issue of whether the extended statutes of limitation established by 
SOX revive previously time-barred claims awaits resolution.234 
V. ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF RETROACTIVE APPLICATION  
A. The Language of Section 804(b) Expresses Congressional Intent for Retroactivity  
 
The first step in the three-step analysis instructs courts to determine whether 
Congress expressly prescribed the statute’s proper reach.235 Section 804(b) of SOX states 
that the new statute of limitations applies to “all proceedings commenced on or after the 
date of enactment.”236 This statement amounts to a clear directive that the new 
limitations period applies to any claim filed after the enactment of SOX regardless of 
whether the claim was previously time barred.237 The Eighth Circuit implicitly agreed 
that a literal reading of the statute would lead to such a result.238 It refused, though, to 
apply the statute retroactively because it found this result puzzling.239 It concluded that 
applying the statute according to its literal terms would lead to a discrepancy.240 Namely, 
stale claims filed prior to enactment would not be revived, whereas claims filed on or 
after the effective date would be revived.241 The Eighth Circuit acknowledged that this 
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discrepancy created the ambiguity and not the language of the statute itself.242 In fact, the 
Eighth Circuit chose to ignore the language of the statute itself when it issued what 
amounted to a policy decision in ADC.
1. A Misstep on the First Step  
 
To begin with, the first step of the three-step analysis does not call for courts to 
analyze the effects of the statutory language; rather, courts need only determine if 
Congress expressly prescribed the statute’s proper reach.243 Furthermore, the Supreme 
Court stated in Landgraf that: “[T]he potential unfairness of retroactive civil legislation is 
not a sufficient reason for a court to fail to give a statute its intended scope.”244 Not only 
did the Eighth Circuit choose to ignore Section 804’s clear directive, it chose also to 
ignore the proper application of the three-step analysis established by the Supreme 
Court.245 
Again, the first step of the three-step analysis requires courts to determine 
whether Congress has expressly provided for the statute’s proper reach.246 The second 
step inquires into retroactive effects, and finally, the third step, absent an express 
Congressional provision and due to the presence of impermissible retroactive effects, 
instructs that the judicial presumption against retroactivity applies.247 In other words, the 
judicial default rules do not come into consideration until after the court has resolved the 
first step of the three-step analysis.248 That determination must be made without 
reference to the presumption.249 Many of the courts performing the three-step analysis 
with respect to Section 804 failed determine whether the plain language of the statute 
provided its proper reach before applying the judicial presumption against 
retroactivity.250 The presence of the presumption during the analysis of the language 
must certainly prejudice the logic and conclusion reached by the court.251 If the court 
begins its analysis with a preconceived notion that it should find against retroactive 
application, the court, due to that preconceived notion, holds the language to a stricter 
standard. Perhaps this explains the faulty conclusion reached by the Eighth Circuit in 
ADC.
242 Id. (“We find this discrepancy to create an ambiguity as to the retroactive application 
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2. Similar Language Leads to Similar Results 
 
Looking to prior decisions, the Supreme Court and two United States courts of 
appeals have previously held that language similar to the language found in Section 
804(b) not only applies retroactively to conduct occurring pre-enactment, but also revives 
claims previously time barred.252 These decisions involved statutes similar to Section 
804(b) that failed to use the terms “retroactive” and “revive,” but nevertheless, they were 
held to reinstate previously time-barred claims.253 
For example, in International Union of Electrical, Radio & Machine Workers, 
AFL-CIO v. Robbins & Meyers, Inc. (Robbins Meyers), the Supreme Court held the 
language “charges pending . . . on the date of the enactment of this Act and all charges 
filed thereafter” applied to all charges whether timely or not upon enactment.254 The 
Court determined that the claim in Robbins Meyers, although untimely when filed, fell 
under the definition of pending and within the scope of the amended statute of 
limitations.255 They explained their reasoning with the statement: “[The] reading of 
‘pending’ confining it to charges still before the Commission and timely when filed is not 
the only possible meaning of the word.”256 In his majority opinion, Justice Rehnquist 
acknowledged that cases “filed and not yet rejected” were also encompassed by a logical 
interpretation of the word pending.257 This acknowledgement leads one to the conclusion 
that the use of the pending language is not imperative in finding Congressional intent for 
retroactivity, and the absence of the word does not render the language of Section 804(b) 
ambiguous.258 
Moreover, refusing to apply the amended statute of limitations to time-barred 
claims filed after the enactment of SOX directly contravenes the language of Section 
804(b) that states it “shall apply to all proceedings . . . commenced on or after the date of 
enactment.”259 Again, the potential unfairness of applying civil legislation retroactively 
does not justify the Court’s failure to give the statute its intended scope.260 The 
conclusion that Section 804(b) does not revive stale claims would force a rather strained 
construction upon Congress’ words.261 Surely, Congress intended the expected 
implications of the language it chose.262 
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3. Saving Section (c)  
 
Several of the courts which analyzed the retroactivity issue remarked on the 
language contained in Section 804(c) of the Act which states: “Nothing in this section 
shall create a new, private right of action.”263 Most of these courts concluded that 
Section 804(c) precluded the revival of previously time-barred claims because that would 
create a new right of action.264 The court in Enterprise Mortgage stated: “Where a 
plaintiff is empowered by a new statute to bring a cause of action that previously had no 
basis in law, a new cause of action has, in some sense of the word, been created.”265 
Section 804(c), however, does not encompass the issue of retroactive application.266 
Section 804(a) of SOX states that the new statute of limitations applies to claims 
of “fraud, deceit, manipulation, or contrivance in contravention of a regulatory 
requirement concerning the securities laws.”267 The legislative history indicates that 
“private right of action” refers only to rights of action expressly enacted by Congress or 
implied by the courts.268 Senator Leahy observed, “[t]his provision states that it is not 
meant to create any new private cause of action but only to govern all the already existing 
private causes of action under the various federal securities laws that have been held to 
support private causes of action.”269 There is no support for the courts’ decisions that 
Section 804(c) operates to preclude the revival of claims.270 A literal interpretation of 
Section 804 of SOX clearly defines the temporal reach of the statute to include claims 
previously time barred under the old statutory scheme, and judicial precedent wholly 
supports that result.271 
B. The Legislative History of Section 804 Supports Retroactivity 
 
The Supreme Court fully expected other courts to examine the legislative history 
surrounding a statute in the first step of the three-step analysis set out in Landgraf.272 
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The Landgraf Court scrutinized the legislative history surrounding the Civil Rights Act of 
1991 before holding the amended statute applied retroactively.273 A great debate 
surrounds the use of legislative history in the interpretation of statutes, “but judges may 
legitimately consult materials like committee reports or floor statements in the search for 
intent where the language [of a statute] is ambiguous.”274 The legislative history 
surrounding Section 804 and SOX in general indicate Congress’ intent that the amended 
statutes of limitation applied retroactively.275 
The argument for retroactive application finds its chief support in the comments 
of Senator Leahy.276 On the floor of the Senate, Senator Leahy stated with regard to 
Section 804 of SOX that, “[t]his section, by its plain terms, applies to any and all cases 
filed after the effective date of the Act, regardless of when the underlying conduct 
occurred”277 The language “any and all” reinforces the conclusion that Section 804(b) 
shall apply to all proceeding filed after the enactment without exception.278 If Senator 
Leahy contemplated an exception for previously time-barred claims, certainly he would 
have said as much.  The phrase “regardless of when the underlying conduct occurred” 
plainly indicates that Congress intended the Section to apply to pre-enactment events.279 
Nowhere in the legislative history does it suggest Congress meant to distinguish between 
claims that had expired before the enactment and claims which had not yet expired upon 
enactment.280 A plain, facial reading of Section 804 alone supports Congress’ intent that 
the Act operates to revive previously time-barred claims, and the language of the statute  
taken in concert with the legislative history further reinforces this argument.281 
C. Further Support for Retroactive Application 
 
Courts often look to traditional canons of construction to aid in the interpretation 
of statutory language.282 One such canon provides that statutes which are remedial in 
nature are to be liberally construed.283 In fact, in 1969, the Supreme Court held that the 
language of Section 10(b) must be interpreted liberally in order to accomplish the “broad 
anti-fraud purposes of the statute.”284 A second traditional canon provides that “to effect 
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its purpose a statute may be implemented beyond its text.”285 In U.S. v. Carlton, the 
Supreme Court upheld Congress’ power to remove a tax deduction retroactively, even 
when the tax-payer arranged his transactions in reliance upon the deduction.286 The 
Carlton Court explained its reasoning rested in the fact that the holding was appropriate 
to effectuate the purpose of the statute and achieve its curative effect.287 Taken together, 
these two traditional canons of construction and prior case law permit the retroactive 
application of Section 804.  The legislative history states: “This legislation aims to 
prevent and punish corporate and criminal fraud, protect the victims of such fraud, 
preserve the evidence of such fraud, and hold wrongdoers accountable for their 
actions.”288 The legislation clearly demonstrated a remedial nature.  To effectuate the 
remedial purpose of Section 804, courts must allow the revival of previously time-barred 
claims in order to protect the victims of fraud and punish wrongdoers. Senator Leahy 
stated, “[t]here ought to be some way for the people who lost their pensions, lost their life 
savings, to get it back.”289 Allowing Section 804 of SOX to revive previously time-
barred claims accomplishes that task.  
 One final argument in support of retroactive application of Section 804 rests in 
the concept that the revival of time-barred claims does not operate to impose 
impermissible retroactive effects.  In his majority opinion in Robbins Meyers, Justice 
Rehnquist stated “certainly it cannot be said that lifting the bar of a statute of limitation 
so as to restore a remedy lost through mere lapse of time is per se an offense against the 
Fourteenth Amendment.”290 There are no vested rights in the running of a statute of 
limitations to prevent a remedy.291 In his Landgraf dissent, Justice Blackmun stated: 
“There is no vested right to do wrong.”292 One traditional argument against the 
retroactive application of new legislation states that “[e]lementary considerations of 
fairness dictate that individuals should have an opportunity to know what the law is and 
conform their conduct accordingly.”293 The Court in Carlton chose to ignore this 
argument, instead finding that the inequitable results were rationally related to achieving 
the legitimate remedial purpose and trumped any considerations of notice of the law.294 
Even if impermissible retroactive effects presented themselves in the retroactive 
application of Section 804, the impermissible effects would be justified in order to 
achieve the remedial purpose of the statute. Obviously, the vast majority of courts 
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handling the retroactivity issue insist upon ignoring or misapplying the proper three-step 
analysis in favor of confusion and injustice.  
 
VI. CONCLUSION  
As the parties in Tello await a factual determination by the district court on the 
issue of notice, interested parties everywhere await a possible holding by the Eleventh 
Circuit allowing the retroactive application of Section 804 of SOX.295 Retroactivity is 
not a new concept.296 Until a few decades ago, the established understanding was that 
new legislation applied prospectively, and judicial decisions applied retroactively.297 The 
Supreme Court’s decisions on retroactivity in the legislative context have wavered 
between a flexible discretionary approach and a pragmatic adherence to judicial 
presumptions against retroactive application.298 The modern Court has been consistently 
deferential to the concept of legislative retroactivity perhaps due to the “erosion of the 
doctrine of substantive due process.”299 The Court has yet to sufficiently clarify the issue 
of legislative retroactivity, and it is likely to be the focus of numerous decisions yet to 
come.300 
The history of securities litigation in the United States illustrates the significance 
of the retroactivity issue.301 Ever since the Supreme Court recognized an implied private 
right of action under Section 10(b), the multiple branches of government have been 
striving to establish the proper structure and scope of those claims.302 Very often, the 
objectives of each work in opposition to each other.303 Power struggles and policy 
consideration further frustrate any attempts for uniformity and simplicity.304 The 
Supreme Court created a basic framework for retroactive analysis with its decision in 
Landgraf, but courts continue to abuse and misapply it.305 Some courts choose to ignore 
it altogether.306 
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 When SOX became effective in 2002, many experts anticipated the reemergence 
of the retroactivity issue.307 The majority of decisions specifically concerning the SOX 
extended statute of limitations demonstrate an unwillingness of the courts to allow 
retroactivity.308 This unwillingness cannot stand alongside the language and purpose of 
the Act, but the Eleventh Circuit remains the only court of appeals to recognize this 
truth.309 While Tello signifies a step in the right direction, the tumultuous history of the 
issue indicates many additional steps are required for resolution.310 Courts must permit 
retroactive application of the SOX extended statutes of limitation in order to achieve the 
Acts curative effect.  
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